Six months into the tenure of New Zealand’s centre-right coalition government, a new approach to Southeast Asia is taking shape.

Southeast Asia has long been important to New Zealand. Two-way trade with the ASEAN bloc totals more than NZ$15 billion annually – making it the country’s fourth-largest trading partner. New Zealand has deep defence ties with Singapore and Malaysia through the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). It has long been an enthusiastic supporter of ASEAN-led regionalism.

However, if there is a longstanding bipartisan interest in the region, there has been a discernible shift in emphasis since Christopher Luxon’s coalition government took office in November 2023.

First, there is a determination to actively “step up” engagement with regional states. Both Prime Minister Luxon and Foreign Minister Winston Peters were highly critical of the previous Labour government’s introspective focus during the pandemic and its immediate aftermath. They charge that New Zealand ministers in the previous government were slow to get back on the road and that, in relative terms, the country had fallen behind.

By any measure, the coalition has put its air miles where its mouth is. The 79-year-old Peters has hardly stopped travelling since he started his third term as foreign minister. In March, he visited Singapore and Indonesia (and India). In early June, he embarked on a four-nation trip to Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Timor-Leste. In between, there have been multiple trips to the Pacific, Europe, the Middle East and the United States.

For his part, Prime Minister Luxon travelled to Melbourne to meet Southeast Asian leaders on the sidelines of the Australia-ASEAN Special Summit. In March, he hosted his Vietnamese counterpart Pham Minh Chinh. In April, his first extended overseas trip took him on a three-nation tour to Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. Ministers with trade, commerce, defence, and climate change portfolios have also been out in the region. Overseas travel has been matched with a notable step up in engagement with the ASEAN diplomatic corps in Wellington.

Second, there is a new pragmatism evident in the government’s approach. The previous foreign minister championed a foreign policy grounded in the country’s founding document, the Treaty of Waitangi, arguing that Māori values should underpin New Zealand’s engagement with the world. Those ideas certainly captured the attention of some in Southeast Asia, particularly civil society audiences in Malaysia and Indonesia when the minister visited. However, the values-driven approach has also unsettled some governments. Indonesia expressed worry about what a focus on self-determination meant for its territorial integrity. Others found the Ardern government’s emphasis on ‘dialogue and de-escalation’ frustrating in a region increasingly marked by coercion and sharp competition.

The Coalition has been quick to embrace what it describes as a clear-sighted “realism”, which Peters has bluntly said is a “shift from our predecessors’ vaguer notions of an indigenous foreign policy that no one else understood, let alone shared.” A briefing document drawn up for the incoming government late last year called for nothing less than a “reset” of foreign policy. In Southeast Asia, it called for the prioritising of six key relationships – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam – backed up with sustained high-level political attention. Showing up for ASEAN meetings, it said, “is essential but no longer sufficient… We need to get to know [Southeast Asian states] better individually.”

Third, and related, New Zealand’s traditionally trade-focused approach to Southeast Asia is starting to become balanced by other interests. To be sure, the economic importance of the ASEAN bloc to New Zealand is not going to change. Luxon has a particular fascination with the Singapore success story and is keen to find ways to emulate its dynamism. The Coalition has announced a goal to double exports and sees opportunities to grow trade relationships and attract Southeast Asian investment.

However, a striking feature of all the recent visits has been the attention given to security issues.

During Luxon’s Philippines trip, the two countries announced plans to conclude a Mutual Defence Logistics Agreement and a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that would make it easier for New Zealand Defence Force ships and aircraft to rotate through the Philippines. New Zealand and Singapore pledged to ‘elevate’ their existing Enhanced Partnership, drawing speculation that there might be plans to revive the idea of basing Singaporean military aircraft in New Zealand. Speaking to the Shangri-La Dialogue in June, Defence Minister Judith Collins said that “building individual relationships with key partners in Southeast Asia is more critical than ever.”

In this sense, the uptick in engagement with Southeast Asia can be seen as part of a broader emphasis on the Indo-Pacific. Luxon has talked about wanting to achieve a “meaningful lift” in the bilateral relationship with India, including growing defence ties. In mid-June, he visited Japan, where security concerns featured prominently and Luxon announced that for the first time, a Royal New Zealand Navy vessel would join a New Zealand Defence Force P-8 aircraft to enforce North Korea sanctions. In another break with the previous government’s approach, the Coalition has spoken in positive terms about minilaterals, noting “powerful reasons for New Zealand engaging practically” with the Quad and AUKUS.

So far, the stepped-up attention on Southeast Asia seems to have been well-received, although some in the region are doubtlessly taking a ‘wait and see’ approach to see if the positive start can be kept up. Luxon’s enthusiasm for a more active foreign policy has been matched with a series of swingeing cuts to the public sector at home. The defence and foreign affairs portfolios have been spared the worst, but hopes to build a wider ‘whole of government’ footprint in Southeast Asia, as Australia has, will surely struggle in the face of reduced budgets. Similarly, for all the talk about security issues, regional defence partners will be looking carefully at New Zealand’s upcoming Defence Capability Plan to see if impressive rhetoric is translated into actual investment.

2025 marks the 50th anniversary of New Zealand becoming an ASEAN Dialogue Partner. It has the potential to be a celebratory year for the relationship. But how loud the cheers will be from the region will greatly depend on how well Wellington can convince its partners that the new government’s promised step up is going to be both serious and, perhaps more importantly, sustained.

The article was first published on Fulcrum.

David Capie is Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations at Victoria University of Wellington.