Comment: China’s think-tanks have been busy of late. Since June, they’ve been charged with predicting the outcome of the US presidential election, analysing what it could mean for China, and preparing briefs for the leadership on how it should approach the new administration come January.
On the first question, most predictions in China were for a Trump victory. Many scholars echoed the Fox News critique of the Democratic Party as ‘typical out-of-touch liberals’, instinctively understanding the rightward turn in US politics and correctly gauging the mood of the nation.
On the second question, the view of most scholars was that the new administration means one of two things for China. It will either be bad, or it will be really bad, hence the early prep.
Many scholars argued the incoming administration would not just be an aberration but would instead mark a fundamental shift in US foreign and domestic policy.
This was framed as part of the turbulent shift toward a multipolar order and, to steal a phrase from China, a new era of international politics.
Few spoke of being able to cut a deal. Many hoped for a cooperative relationship, which is the official position, but there was little confidence this would be possible.
On the question of how to respond, the think-tanks were exploring how China can navigate probable tariffs, loose rhetoric, and unpredictable shifts in policy toward China.
Many noted the US had already changed its assessments of and policy toward China, framing China as a peer competitor or a reemergent power, or talking about a shifting balance of power. These scholars expected to see further changes in US policy to try to reverse this trend.
There was widespread concern that the new administration would damage Chinese interests and seek to hobble Chinese growth. They put forth a range of measures to protect Chinese interests.
First, China would likely double its efforts in multilateral institutions. A potential US retreat from the United Nations, climate pacts, and the World Trade Organization was viewed by scholars as an opportunity for China to seize the initiative in these organisations.
China’s ideas for reforming global governance will present challenges for many countries. China’s proposals are generally illiberal, sympathetic to the security interests of authoritarian regimes such as Russia, and promote a shift in influence from West to East and from North to South.
New Zealand will need to invest a lot more in understanding these moves and forming coalitions of countries to defend rules and interests in multilateral fora as well as finding areas of cooperation with China where it can.
The danger is that New Zealand commentators become distracted by the Trump administration, as they were last time, and ignore China’s efforts to promote ‘true multilateralism’ and the diminution of liberal internationalist rules and norms.
While it’s far easier to follow the theatrics of an English-speaking liberal democracy, we shouldn’t let this diminish our focus on China’s consequential efforts to reform multilateralism.
Second, China will likely remind US businesses of their bottom lines and seek a champion for these interests that is close to Trump.
Announcements of high-ranking positions in the next administration suggest many will view China as a rival. Others reportedly close to Trump will have significant economic interests in China. If Trump initiates the trade remedies that he says he will, then those interests could be harmed and potentially act as a break on Trump’s policies.
The People’s Daily, for example, is already reminding Elon Musk of his lucrative Tesla EV production facilities in China.
The message is simple. Chinese officials have the means and will to ensure any economic pain they feel will also be felt by US businesses and consumers, if it comes to that.
The third response will likely be an effort to strengthen relations with countries in China’s periphery. We’ve already seen improvements in the India-China relationship, efforts to improve relations with South Korea and Japan, and a major push to develop relations with Indonesia and the Global South.
China is unlikely to make the same mistake it made last time when many of its regional relationships deteriorated. It will be pushing countries not to support potential US measures against China and see an opportunity to reverse the progress the Biden administration made developing a more coherent regional response to China.
Chinese scholars see an opportunity to push these countries to do less with a US administration that has positions that could be harder to work with.
This creates new challenges for countries such as New Zealand that have sought to maintain significant economic interests with China while carefully managing challenging aspects of that relationship and simultaneously strengthening economic and security relations with the US.
As in 2016, such a policy could now be challenged from both sides.
This article was originally published on Newsroom.
Jason Young is director of the New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre at Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington.