Comment: Following France’s President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to New Caledonia on Thursday, attention has turned to the country’s political future beyond the ongoing crisis.

The uprising, which began on 14 May, has demonstrated the capacity and determination of those involved to shut down the country and to inflict extensive economic damage. The country has almost ground to a standstill with key institutions and services, including the international airport, closed. The capital, Nouméa, has been under siege from within.

With transport routes cut off, authorities have been forced to count how many weeks’ worth of supplies the city has left. A state of emergency is not due to expire until 27 May.

Anxious to restore so-called ‘republican order’, authorities have deployed 3,000 gendarmes, but many of the blockades within Nouméa and around the country have been maintained and more importantly there remain fundamental political and social challenges to overcome.

Over the past week, the analyses that have emerged of the situation underscore four key issues:

• The French government’s plan to open New Caledonia’s electoral rolls to French citizens with only 10 years of residence by preparing an amendment to France’s constitution; this is the immediate catalyst for the unrest
• France’s failure in 2021 to conduct the third of the independence referendums provided for by the 1998 Nouméa Accord in such a way that it would be beyond all possible reproach; this primed a timebomb that has now gone off
• The strong-arm methods employed in attempts since 2021 to reach a new ‘global accord’ on New Caledonia’s political institutions, including the determination to push through reforms without local consensus, and the deaf ear turned to widespread concerns about the legitimacy of the 2021 referendum
• The wider social and economic conditions that mean many young urban Kanak remain strongly disadvantaged and disillusioned with New Caledonia’s current settings.

Moving beyond the crisis will require genuine attempts to address these issues. None will be easy.

At the end of his visit, Macron signalled at least a small pause on the proposed electoral reform before discussion resumes and has installed a high-level delegation to engage in dialogue over the coming month. He has doubled down however on the validity of the results of the previous referendums and reiterated the need for New Caledonians to reach and then vote on a new ‘global accord’ that might then be enshrined in France’s constitution (as is the current Nouméa Accord).

All eyes now are on local political leaders. In the lead-up to the visit, hardline ‘loyalists’, notably deputy Nicolas Metzdorf, called for Macron to not withdraw the proposed electoral reform, while a more moderate anti-independence party, Caledonie Ensemble, called for the pause as did Nouméa’s mayor, Sonia Lagarde.

The independentist parties represented by the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front reiterated that they were disposed to reaching an agreement on an electoral reform in the future, but they want that to be part of a comprehensive accord that provides for a continuation of the decolonisation process, “introducing a final stage in the programme to achieve independence”.

What would it take to reach a new accord?

What ultimately needs to be addressed is the future of the decolonisation process embodied in the 1998 Nouméa Accord. There have been reports that talks began last year towards reaching a new ‘global accord’ have continued despite the unrest. While the precise shape of any new accord remains hard to predict, the key issue that it will have to address (in addition to issues such as electoral reform) is the conditions for a future referendum on self-determination or independence.

Clues as to how that might be handled can be gleaned from statements made over the past nine months.

In September 2023, France’s Minister of the Interior Gérald Darminin stated that a draft accord then under discussion proposed to set out conditions for achieving self-determination without proposing any specific date. Possible conditions identified included the idea that any future referendum should be on a specific ‘project’ rather than a binary yes/no vote; and the idea that a vote of two-thirds of New Caledonia’s congress might be required to initiate any referendum (an idea that underscores the importance of who makes up this local body).

Other suggestions have been voiced. In September 2023, the president of New Caledonia’s Customary Senate Victor Gogny suggested a 10-year transition period to prepare the population for independence. And just this week, on 22 May, Jacques Lalié, the independentist president of the Islands Province, suggested that “in this global agreement we could propose a transitional period of 15 to 20 years at the end of which ‘sovereignty in partnership or association’ with France would be established”.

From the harder edge of the ‘loyalist’ side it has been argued that any consultation should be set back for 50 years or ‘two generations’. This idea has been taken up by the leader of France’s far right, Marine Le Pen, who last week expressed the desire for “a comprehensive institutional and economic agreement, with a new consultation [on independence] in 40 years’ time”.

It is doubtful though whether any new accord involving a significant deferral of independence will satisfy those at the barricades. While their views have not been much heard thus far, it is important to remember that in 1988 and again in 1998, independentist leaders had a tough job selling to the grassroots the political accords that deferred the question of independence. Those involved in this current uprising appear to have higher expectations and to be less patient.

This article was originally published on Newsroom.

Adrian Muckle is a senior lecturer in Pacific History at Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington.