VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON
TE HERENGA WAKA

CAPITAL THINKING. GLOBALLY MINDED.
MAI I TE IHO KI TE PAE

Stay in touch... Facebook Twitter YouTube

Welcome to the December 2020 CPF Newsletter

We suspect that, like us, you are probably looking forward to the end of a difficult year in 2020. In terms of New Zealand's vulnerability to Covid-19, at least, the second half of the year has been better than the first half. From the point of view of the university and the national economy, however, the second half has brought new challenges and uncertainties.

The Chair in Public Finance is not immune from these either, especially in light of the drastic shift to a large financial deficit in the university's budget. In addition, with historically unprecedented levels of public debt, over coming months our public service sponsors might be expected to undertake some reprioritising of their projects and finances. Nevertheless, much of the work of the CPF in recent months has continued roughly as planned.

Of course the biggest topic of discussion in the fiscal policy space has been the size and consequences of New Zealand's massive expansion of public debt since the pandemic began. Inevitably too, questions have been asked about the wisdom of the monetary 'quantitative easing' programme that the Reserve Bank has pursued, both because of its novel approach (in New Zealand at least) to monetary stimulus, and whether the accompanying large-scale purchasing of newly issued public debt undermines the Bank's political independence. We highlight latest contributions to these debates below.

In brief, in this issue:

- We link to two recent media commentaries by Professor Arthur Grimes (VUW) and Professor Ananish Choudhuri (Auckland University). These offer challenges to some modern opinions on New Zealand's monetary policy and public debt funding respectively.

- In a longer media article, Norman Gemmell questions the wisdom of the Labour government's newly legislated increase in the top personal income tax rate to 39%.
- Other recent tax news in the media include articles on interest.co.nz by Terry Baucher highlighting issues with the government's possible changes to the bright-line test for capital gains tax, and possible 'integrity measures' that Inland Revenue are being encouraged to pursue to reduce avoidance of the new top income tax rate.
- We also report on the latest research coming out of our MBIE project on measuring income inequality and mobility in New Zealand, as we embark on analysis of newly created longitudinal databases for individual and family incomes in NZ.
- In people news, we offer our congratulations to:
  - Dr Patrick Nolan on his move to manage the Treasury's Analysis & Insights team. Among its various tasks, this team looks after much of Treasury's tax modelling;
  - Dr Alastair Thomas on the recent award of his PhD at Victoria University on the subject of the distributional effects of value-added taxes in OECD countries, including chapters focussed on New Zealand.

Norman Gemmell and Nazila Alinaghi
December 2020

Media Articles

The New Top Income Tax Rate: A Virtue-Signalling Reform?

By Norman Gemmell

There was a strong sense of déjà vu within New Zealand's tax community this month, as parliament passed the new Labour government's tax bill that raises the top rate of personal income tax from 33% to 39% on incomes over $180,000 from April 1st, 2021. Back in 1999, the Clark-Cullen Labour government did exactly the same when it came into office, setting a new 39% top tax rate from April 2000 on personal incomes above $60,000 (equivalent to about $90,000 today).

It is no surprise when a left-leaning government brings in a new top tax rate on a small minority of high-earning taxpayers. Finance Minister Michael Cullen's reform was predicted to hit only the top 5% of taxpayers, while Finance Minister Grant Robertson claims his 39% rate will only hit the top 2% of incomes. Clearly, raising taxes on taxpayers who are unlikely to vote for a Labour government anyway and who are, in any case, a very small minority, carries little political risk at election time. Indeed, there may even be a clear majority of voters in favour of such a change, since tax research has regularly found voters are much more likely to favour higher public spending and taxes when the taxes in question are those others are likely to pay!

It may seem therefore that lower- and middle-income voters have little to lose by voting for tax increases on the top 2% of earners. Or have they? There are several reasons to query the wisdom of raising the top income tax rate.

First, democratic majority voting systems have long been recognised in theories of political economy as having the potential to suffer from “the tyranny of the minority by the majority”. That is, where small identifiable groupings of voters, who are too small to ever influence electoral outcomes, can be persistently ‘tyrannised’ by policy designed to benefit the majority at their expense. Small ethnic minorities in particular can feel this way in multi-ethnic societies with majority voting systems. Of course, it need not necessarily be the case, such as when political parties with very small vote shares, such as the Greens, ACT and New Zealand First, are able to hold the balance of power between larger parties.

The danger of ‘tyrannising’ top rate income taxpayers is that, unlike ethnic-based minorities, they often have the capacity to react in ways that undermine the policy, such as moving to other tax jurisdictions (top earners are usually internationally fairly mobile) and reducing or re-characterising their incomes to avoid the tax.

Tax analysts frequently focus on the capacity of high earners to avoid higher tax rates, such as whether they can change their hours of work or the types of remuneration they receive (salary, share ownership schemes, capital gains, dividends, etc) or their access to self-employment income with looser reporting rules.

But an equally important consideration is the willingness of high earners to accept a new tax regime. How far can those taxpayers be expected to regard their tax levels as ‘fair’ – and hence demonstrate a willingness to comply – rather than feel ‘tyrannised’ and therefore inclined to rebel? Ultimately, majority voting systems rely on this willingness to abide by the decision of the majority, which in turn depends on whether they feel their personal welfare is suitably recognised.

Of course, fairness in the distribution of the tax burden across voter income levels will always be a matter of subjective judgement. But research suggests, unsurprisingly, that perceiving increased tax rates on higher income earners as ‘fair’ is positively associated with the taxpayer in question having an income level below the relevant threshold! This is not a healthy basis for designing tax systems, since voluntary compliance will be compromised where taxpayers systematically consider the burden of paying taxes should rest on others, rather than themselves.

These ‘willingness to pay’ and ‘capacity to avoid’ tax considerations naturally lead to the question: how high a top marginal tax rate is too high? Economic researchers have focused on this question in recent years: what is the ‘optimal’ top income tax rate, taking account of both equity and efficiency considerations?

Unfortunately, most of this literature has focused on the top 1% or 0.1% of earners, especially in the US, a country with no equivalent of New Zealand’s GST – which is effectively a second tax on income, albeit net of any income saved, currently set at 15%. These studies can come up with ‘optimal’ top tax rates on income of the wealthiest around 40-60%. Crucially, however, in considering fairness in tax treatment across all taxpayers, they typically give zero weight to the welfare of the top rate payers. In other words, these optimal top tax rates are based on ignoring the preferences of those who pay them!

In the New Zealand case, a top rate of 39% on the top 2% of income earners may not seem high by international standards. Two other factors are important, however. First, the effective top income tax rate would be around 52% when GST is factored in. Second, being a small country, the absolute number of income taxpayers above the new top threshold of $180,000 is small; for example, in 2019 there were around 25,000 taxpayer earning more than $300,000. It does not take many of them, especially those on the highest incomes, to decide to move overseas (or otherwise drastically cut their taxable incomes here) for the fairness, revenue raising and integrity of the New Zealand income tax to be undermined.

And losing our top income earners would be a big deal tax-wise. Currently, a company CEO or entrepreneur earning taxable income of $1 million a year is liable to pay around $320,000 in income tax; for a $2 million earner this becomes $650,000. When the new top tax rate of 39% arrives in April 2021, these taxpayers will be liable for an extra $60,000 and $110,000 tax respectively. So, it matters not just what most taxpayers think is fair but what these taxpayers think is fair.

Importantly, it is highly questionable whether the proposed 39% rate above $180,000 will deliver the equity and revenue outcomes the government is heralding. Inland Revenue's **Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA)** provides a fascinating insight into officials' appraisal of the likely equity and other effects of the higher rate.

The RIA reports that, even allowing for no behavioural responses to the higher top tax rate (such as diverting income to non-taxable, or less taxed, sources), the Gini measure of income inequality is projected to drop ('improve') by only 0.2% percentage points: from 0.493 to 0.491. If the anticipated tax avoidance occurs, this equity effect will be even smaller or wiped out.

In revenue-raising terms, the new top rate is also modest at best – Inland Revenue's limited allowance for tax-avoiding behaviour generates an average increase in revenue of just over $500 million a year over the first four years of operation (although an extra $95 million in 2020-21, before the new tax rate comes in, presumably because some taxpayers bring their income forward one year to avoid the increase). $500 million would represent just an additional 0.5% of the government's expected total tax revenue in 2021. Even this estimate, the RIA admits, may be a substantial overestimate if behavioural responses are larger than the limited amount allowed for in the assessment. Estimates of those responses by myself and colleagues at Victoria University of Wellington suggest that, indeed, there may be very little additional revenue arising from the 39% rate. And it should be remembered that even $500 million extra tax revenue will do little to reduce inequality unless the government expenditure it finances is suitably targeted, such as at additional social housing rather than infrastructure.

Perhaps the RIA's most adverse judgement on the proposed increase is its impact on tax system 'integrity' (how robust it is against tax sheltering or rorting behaviour). If there was one clear lesson from Cullen's 2000 top tax rate increase, it was that the trust tax rate should have been increased along with the top personal income tax rate. This did not happen and what followed was **a massive increase in the use of trusts to reduce taxpayers' income tax liabilities**. In addition, New Zealand's absence of a comprehensive capital gains tax – then and now – further facilitated tax-avoiding activity. Strangely, Robertson plans to repeat this mistake, preferring instead – against officials' best advice – simply to ask Inland Revenue to "investigate integrity measures" to help mitigate the guaranteed avoidance responses.

All of this suggests the net benefit from raising the top personal income tax rate to 39% may be very limited. Remarkably, the 2020 Labour manifesto commitment to legislate this tax change so soon after the election came about with limited attention to advice from tax officials and after the government's own Tax Working Group had recommended a capital gains tax, while being prohibited by the government from considering any income tax changes.

It is tempting therefore to conclude that this top tax rate policy has more to do with perceptions among many of the government's supporters that a tax system to deliver reduced income inequality necessitates a higher marginal income tax rate on top earners. As we all know, in politics voter perceptions matter greatly for electoral outcomes. This tax policy may therefore be better described as primarily a virtue-signalling reform aimed at satisfying a substantial constituency of the government's voters and activists, despite contributing minimally to its inequality objectives in reality.

Media Commentary

Destabilising Asset Prices by RBNZ: A real danger

In his recent talk to **interest.co.nz**, Prof Arthur Grimes warns about the real danger of the Reserve Bank destabilising asset prices by lowering interest rates to achieve its 'maximum sustainable employment' target.

Covid-19, Pandemic Debt, and Printing more Money

A recent **article** by Prof Ananish Chaudhuri discusses why the government cannot simply cancel the pandemic debt by printing more money.

Extending the Bright-Line Test for investment properties

Two media articles on interest.co.nz by Terry Baucher recently highlighted issues with the government's possible changes to the bright-line test for capital gains tax, and the proposed 'integrity measures' that Inland Revenue are being encouraged to pursue to reduce avoidance of the new top tax rate. The bright-line tests allows Inland Revenue to pursue payment of tax on capital gains on a residential property (other than a primary residence) sold within two years (subsequently five years) of its purchase.

Baucher reports that Finance Minister, Grant Robertson has requested Treasury to explore options around extending the bright-line test, while Inland Revenue has been reminding tax agents about bright-line test compliance by sending emails to the owners of residential properties who they think might meet the bright-line criteria.

Both articles can be read in full **here** and **here**.

News from Sponsors

The Treasury

Financial Statements of the Government

The Treasury released the **financial statements of the government** for the year ended 30 June 2020.

The latest numbers suggest that, despite the large pandemic-induced increase in borrowing (via an operating balance deficit) and reduction in net worth, the NZ economy seems at present to be more resilient than Treasury was forecasting at the time of Budget 2020 in May.

Overseas Investment screening rules retained

In June 2020, the government announced changes to strengthen the Overseas Investment regime in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The government will retain the Emergency Notification Regime in the Overseas Investment for the second 90 days in a row to ‘ensure that New Zealand’s national interest remains protected’. This is due to revise by 24 February 2021.

New Research

Constructing Longitudinal Databases for the Analysis of Individual and Family Income Dynamics in New Zealand

By Nazila Alinaghi

In late 2019, three of us (John Creedy, Norman Gemmell and myself) began our MBIE Endeavour Fund supported project to examine income inequality and mobility in New Zealand. This note reports on the project’s major first year activity of constructing longitudinal databases for both individual- and family-level incomes that will enable subsequent income inequality and mobility analysis.

While there is now a fair amount of evidence of a cross-sectional nature on income inequality, there is still very little evidence on the dynamics of income over time in New Zealand, especially for families or households. Yet, in many cases income at the family or household level is a better measure of consumption or wellbeing, since individuals in family groups tend to share economic resources, albeit to varying extents.

Income dynamic aspects influence both longer-term measures of income inequality and the processes generating movements into and out of poverty. Despite this, the vast majority of empirical studies investigating income inequality and poverty provide only snapshot information based on cross-sectional data, at least for New Zealand. This tends to overstate the degree of longer-term income inequality and the ‘depth’ of poverty by necessarily ignoring transitory and life-cycle variations. The situation becomes even more complicated when the dynamics of families or households are of interest. This is because families experience changes in size and composition affecting the dynamic characteristics of their incomes.

This is illustrated in the two diagrams below which use the analogy of a ten floor apartment building to illustrate income distribution deciles. The first diagram focuses on individuals. For simplicity, there are only two time periods and three individuals in each decile. All individuals are shown in monochrome in the cross-sectional case (left-hand panel) to indicate that individual movements cannot be distinguished and tracked over time. However, the individual-specific colours in the right hand panel show how longitudinal data captures, and can therefore track, the movements of those individuals within the income distribution.





The next diagram illustrates the longitudinal case for families. Again for simplicity, there are only six individuals within each decile, each family is given a family-specific colour, and changes over time are limited to family formation and break-up. It is clear that tracking income movements for families quickly becomes much more complicated than for individuals. This is compounded when other changes such as entries (in the form of births and inward migration) and exists (in the form of deaths and outward migrations) are allowed for.



To establish how individual and family characteristics determine observed income movements and positions in the income hierarchy, as well as addressing the extent of poverty persistence, the first step in our project has been to construct a suitable family-level database. To address this, we constructed two longitudinal datasets – at the individual and family levels – using Statistics NZ's Integrated Data Infrastructure (IDI). The main advantages of constructing these datasets are their coverage, information on demographic characteristics, and family relationship information such as marriages, civil partnerships and children.

The final sample at the individual level contains over five million taxpayer/year observations, for a range of variables including, for example, taxable income, gender, ethnicity, education level, and location. This includes all taxpayers with at least one income record over the period of study (2000 – 2017), yielding a longitudinal dataset covering over 1.6 million taxpayers.

As a result of partnership formation and dissolution and the arrival/departure of children, the dynamics of family structure quickly becomes complicated, as illustrated in the second diagram. Using a number of administrative data sources, a key challenge arises from a feature of most administrative datasets: they generally observe parent-child and partner relationships at only one point (or at best, several points) in time. However, the study of income dynamics at the family level requires those relationships to be linked across years.

To capture these changes in family formation several administrative data sources containing family information along with the 2013 Census (the only census currently linked to the IDI) were used. Additionally, two stand-alone Censuses in 2001 and 2006 were added to further identify partnership information.

As we approach the next stage of the project, we hope that these datasets will provide a valuable resource for economic analyses of income inequality and mobility where the importance of the accounting period over which income is measured is recognised. More details on the construction of the individual and family datasets can be found in two recent working papers here and here respectively.

People News

Patrick Nolan: Analytics & Insights Manager, The Treasury

Patrick Nolan has joined the Treasury as the manager of the Analytics and Insights team. He joins the Treasury from the New Zealand Productivity Commission, where he was the Director of the Commission’s Economics and Research team and the inquiry into frontier firms.

The Treasury’s A&I team has two key functions. One is to conduct primary research using Stats NZ's Integrated Data Infrastructure (IDI). The IDI links together a wide range of survey and administrative data on New Zealand individuals, households and businesses.

The A&I team also maintains, develops, and operates the TAWA (Tax and Welfare Analysis) model, which is the Treasury's microsimulation model of the New Zealand personal tax and welfare system. TAWA can model tax or welfare system changes and assess incomes, costs, poverty, inequality, and distributional impacts at the individual, family, and household levels.

Prior to joining the Treasury, Patrick managed the Commission’s work using the IDI (particularly the longitudinal business database, LBD) to better understand firm performance. He also led the Commission’s work in encouraging LBD research across government agencies.

Patrick also has a long-running interest in tax-transfer modelling. He completed his PhD at Victoria University in 2005 drawing on the Treasury’s TaxMod model, which was a precursor to the TAWA. Of course, the last few decades have seen significant improvements in technology and the availability of data, and so he’s excited by how much the value of microsimulation models like TAWA has grown.

PhD Student Updates

Congratulations to Dr. Alastair Thomas

Alastair was recently awarded his PhD for his thesis on "The Distributional Effects of Value-added Taxes in OECD Countries". He is currently a Senior Economist at the OECD's Centre for Tax Policy and Administration in Paris, France.

Abstract: The thesis investigates the distributional effects of the value-added tax (VAT/GST) in OECD countries, and the merits of using reduced VAT rates to achieve distributional goals. The research adopts a microsimulation modelling approach that draws on household expenditure microdata from household budget surveys for an unprecedented 27 OECD countries.

A consistent microsimulation methodology is adopted to ensure cross-country comparability of results. Non-behavioural VAT microsimulation models are first built to examine the overall distributional impact of the current VAT systems in each country. The research assesses the competing methodological approaches used in previous studies, highlighting the misleading effect of savings patterns on cross-sectional analysis when VAT burdens are measured relative to income. Measuring VAT burdens relative to expenditure – thereby removing the influence of savings – is found to provide a more reliable picture of the distributional impact of the VAT. On this basis, the VAT is found to be either roughly proportional or slightly progressive in most of the 27 OECD countries examined.

Results also show that even a roughly proportional VAT can still have significant equity implications for the poor – potentially pushing some households into poverty. Behavioural VAT microsimulation models are then built for 23 OECD countries to investigate whether reduced VAT rates (which are common in most OECD countries) are an effective way to support poorer households, and whether the use of targeted cash transfers would be more effective.

The behavioural microsimulation methodology follows the Linear Expenditure System based approach of Creedy and Sleeman (2006). Complementing this approach, a Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) is estimated specifically for New Zealand, thereby providing the first estimates of a QUAIDS model based on New Zealand data. Simulation results show, for all countries modelled, that reduced VAT rates are a highly ineffective mechanism for targeting support to poorer households. Not only do rich households benefit from reduced rates, but they benefit more than poor households do in aggregate terms (and sometimes also in proportional terms).

Additional simulation results show that an income-tested cash transfer would better target support to poorer households than reduced VAT rates in all countries. Furthermore, even a universal cash transfer is found to better target poorer households than reduced VAT rates. These results empirically confirm the theoretical expectation that, where available, direct mechanisms (whether via the income tax or benefit system) will better achieve distributional goals than reduced VAT rates. Countries that currently employ reduced VAT rates to achieve distributional goals should therefore consider removing these reduced rates and adjusting their income tax or benefit systems to achieve these distributional goals instead. Countries should also consider removing reduced VAT rates aimed at non-distributional goals where a more effective instrument is available to achieve the particular policy goal. At a minimum, the merits of these reduced VAT

rates should be reassessed in light of their negative distributional impact (The full version of thesis can be found **here**).

Amy Cruickshank

Amy is working towards a PhD in Taxation by distance learning through the School of Accounting and Commercial Law at Victoria University of Wellington. Her research focuses on “the efficacy of government financial support for the charitable sector, including the efficacy of donation tax incentives and government grants for charitable organizations”. Below is a short summary of one of the key chapters of her thesis.

Do Government Grants Crowd-In or Crowd-Out Other Charity Income? Preliminary Evidence from New Zealand Study

This research investigates whether Lottery Grants “crowd-in” or “crowd-out” other charity income sources. This is a classic question in economics and has become more pressing in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic as governments look for effective ways to support charitable organizations.

The study matches administrative data on 17,298 New Zealand Lottery Grants applications from 5,170 charities with data on charity finances and characteristics from the Charities Register over the 2007-2019 period. The study is utilizing a difference-in-differences identification approach and Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to understand how the income of successful applicants evolves relative to counter-factual groups of unsuccessful applicants.

The research has found that the effect of the award outcome on charity income depends on how grant “success” is defined, as charities often have mixed application outcomes or applications awarded, but only partially funded. Preliminary findings suggest that an additional dollar of award income crowds-in income from other sources for small and medium-sized charities and has no statistically significant impact on charity income for large-sized charities.

Public Finance News from Overseas

OECD: Taxation and Philanthropy

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has released a **report** which reviews the tax treatment of philanthropic entities in 40 countries. This report highlights a range of potential tax policy options for countries to consider.

OECD: Taxing Virtual Currencies

The OECD has also released a **report** on taxing virtual currencies. This highlights a number of tax policy considerations which can help policymakers strengthening their regulatory frameworks for taxing virtual currencies.

IMF: Fiscal Monitor

The latest **Fiscal Monitor** reviews the state of public finances across the world. It then goes on to discuss the effectiveness of fiscal policy responses to the COVID-19 crisis and offers a roadmap for an overall fiscal strategy for sustained recovery.



Other Media and Commentary

2020 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences



Paul R. Milgrom Robert B. Wilson

Stanford University economists, Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson, were awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for their research into auctions. Read Stanford University's article on their two economists **here**.

UK Public Spending Review 2020

In the UK, the three-yearly Government Spending Review is a big deal, setting departmental budgets for the following three years. This 2020 version is clearly especially critical in the midst of massive pandemic-related, and heightened recession-related, public spending. In his assessment of the Review, Paul Johnson the IFS Director argues that weaker growth and pressure on the National Health Service (NHS) and welfare budgets could lead to worse than expected public finances over the coming years. The IFS analysis can be found **here**.

Events

Forthcoming Events

CPF Public Economics Research Day – Coming in 2021

Provided we can run a research day within Covid-19 restrictions,
we aim to hold one in February or March at Rutherford House. Keep an eye on your email inbox for an invite. Please email **Anna Burnett** if you would like to be added to our invite list.

Government Economics Network (GEN) 2021 Annual Conference

The GEN 2021 conference will be held on 25th February at Te Papa, Wellington, on the theme of **"Economics to Support Climate Policy"**. Further details are available **here**.

Past Events

With on-site events set to remain on hold for some time yet in many countries, organisations have been looking at new ways of connection such as virtual conferences and webinars. Here are a few interesting conferences/webinars.



Webinar: Helping Kiwi firms reach the productivity frontier

To discuss the Commission's approach to frontier firms inquiry, the Productivity Commission held a webinar. The webinar was recorded and can be found **here**.
Presentation slides are available **here**.

2020 International Institute of Public Finance (IIPF) Congress

Due to the pandemic, the 76th Annual Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance was held online on 19th – 21st August, on the theme of "Public Finance, Natural Resources and Climate Change". More details about the keynote addresses and other presentations can be found **here**. Papers and abstract are available **here**.

Recent Working Papers

Links to recent research and working papers from the Chair in Public Finance.



A working paper by Scobie discusses some implications of Bill Philips work for contemporary macroeconomic



A working paper by Alinaghi, Creedy and Gemmell describes the construction of a unique longitudinal individual-level dataset that



A working paper by Alinaghi, Creedy and Gemmell describes the construction of a unique longitudinal family-level dataset that allows the

policy.
Download this paper

allows the dynamic of individual incomes in NZ to be examined.
Download this paper

dynamic of individual incomes in NZ to be examined.
Download this paper



A working paper by Buckle, Creedy and Ball describes A Schumpeterian Gale: Using Longitudinal Data to Evaluate Responses to Performance-Based Research Funding Systems.
Download this paper



A working paper by Buckle, Creedy and Ball describes Fifteen Years of a PBRFS in New Zealand: Incentives and Outcomes.
Download this paper

Recent Published Papers

Alinaghi, N., Creedy, J. and Gemmell, N. (2020) Elasticities of Taxable Income and Adjustment Costs: Bunching Evidence from New Zealand. Oxford Economic Papers. Forthcoming.

Alinaghi, N., and Reed, W. R. (2020) Taxes and Economic Growth in OECD Countries: A Meta-analysis. Public Finance Review. Available at **https://doi.org/10.1177/1091142120961775**.

Alinaghi, N., Creedy, J. and Gemmell, N. (2020) The Redistributive Effects of a Minimum Wage Increase in New Zealand. Australian Economic Review. Available at **https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8462.12381**.

Ball, C., Creedy, J. and Scobie, G. (2020) Tax Policy and Uncertainty: Modelling Debt Projections and Fiscal Sustainability. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Buckle, R. A. (2020) Fiscal Policy Governance: A Focus on Principles. Chapter 10 in E. Berman and G. Karacaoglu (Eds), Public Policy and Governance Frontiers in New Zealand. Emerald Publishing Ltd.

Buckle, R. A. (2020) Monetary Policy Governance and Inflation Targeting in New Zealand. Chapter 11 in E. Berman and G. Karacaoglu (Eds), Public Policy and Governance Frontiers in New Zealand. Emerald Publishing Ltd.

Chair in Public Finance

+64-4-463 9656

www.wgtn.ac.nz/cpf

cpf-info@vuw.ac.nz

Level 7, Rutherford House, 23 Lambton Quay, Wellington.

Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington

+64-4-472 1000

www.wgtn.ac.nz